The Quest for Liberty in Traditional Asian societies

Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) was the core proponent for defending and reviving the agenda of classical liberalism in the 20th century. His scholarly excellence embraced many academic disciplines and won him the Nobel Prize in economics in 1974. His struggle in the so-called Austrian School of Economics was to withstand the strong currents of historicism, socialism and positivism in the academic circles of the early 20th century, which either merely disregarded the creative potential of empowered individuals, or even legitimised the coercive interference with individual liberties.

In his “Constitution of Liberty”, which was first published in 1960, Hayek outlined why he believed in individual liberty and how it can be achieved. Yet, facing those who argue against individual freedom for collective goods, like equality or social justice, Hayek knew he could not take the belief in liberty for granted. He therefore argued that liberty cannot be seen as just merely one particular value among others. To him, freedom is the source and condition of most moral values, while it leads to development and prosperity because it not only unfolds individual talents and qualifications, but it also sets off the creative powers of a free civilization by utilising the dispersed knowledge that exists only as the separate, partial, and sometimes conflicting beliefs of all men (F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago 1978, p. 25).

Generally, Hayek argued against the rationalist notion that the leaders can create the right institutions for human development. Instead he believed in an evolutionary theory where a certain order emerged as the result of adaptive evolution. Only this kind of order would induce man to use his intelligence to the best effect and bad people could do least harm. Since the beneficial functioning of a free society rests largely on the existence of such freely grown institutions, hence, a free society requires a genuine reverence for grown institutions, for customs and habits and all those securities of liberty which arise from regulation of long prescription and ancient ways. Paradoxical as it may appear, it is probably true that a successful free society will always in a large measure be a tradition-bound society. (p. 61)

The role of tradition in a free society was one topic among many others that were touched upon by the round-table discussion about Hayek’s “Constitution of Liberty” organised by the Atlas Economic Research Foundation and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation on 30 September in Phuket/Thailand.

Anil Baboobhai Patel, Director of Action Research in Community Health and Development, Gujarat, India, explained how Hayek had differentiated between the British and the French concept of liberty. British philosophers defined liberty as the freedom from coercion based on the spontaneously evolved tradition of the common law. Human reason itself was a product of these traditions and could further develop only within the framework of such rules. Meanwhile, the French school of thought under the influence of 17th century philosopher Descartes believed that human reason was everything. They are believed to be capable to reconstruct the society and its institutions as they liked to serve the desired purpose. Descartes had taught that pure reason can achieve true knowledge provided we get rid of the biases of tradition. Traditions were the true impediment to attainment of knowledge.

Anil stated that according to Hayek the role of tradition in the two schools of thought constitutes their true difference. He concluded that while Hayek was a strong supporter of the tradition in the human order, he does not support all traditions beyond any criticism. Hayek knows that there are a numbers of traditions which were not spontaneous traditions, i.e. coercive traditions, like the burning of widows of Indian husbands. If such traditions are in conflict with the tradition of individual liberty, i.e. the rule of law, they can be and must be changed, modified, or even abolished. The issue of domestic violence belongs to this kind of tradition and violations of women’s liberty are not consistent with individual liberty. They must be abolished.

Zaitun ‘Toni’ Mohamed Kasim from Sisters in Islam, Malaysia, further elaborated on this point. She pointed out that the tyranny of the private domain is that it is often blind to the work that is done within it, and the harm and coercion that is perpetuated within it, both of which are primarily born and experienced by women. Toni stated that jobs within the family are invisible investments which are not recognised nor compensated and hence considered as having no value. This explains why they are unfortunately often math-ed away as tradition, culture, religion or ‘nature’. Similarly coercion and violence perpetuated against women in ‘the family’ is often explained away as a function of culture and tradition. Toni therefore rejected the argument of some participants that there is no need for separate legislation that deals with domestic violence, as this is already prohibited by broader laws on freedom from violence. Instead, she insisted that domestic violence has yet, in many societies, to be recognised as a specific form of violence with its particular dynamics. Legislating against it helps to ‘name the crime’ and in so doing lifts the shroud of silence around the crime, thus advancing the ideals and ideas of equality.

Toni concluded that no society that believes in liberty